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BOOK REVIEWS
THE NEw CAsTrry AND OTHER ARGumEN s AcAixsT Wom 's LmERATnom.

By Midge Decter. New York: Coward, McCann & Greog-

hegan, Inc., 1972. Pp. 181. $5.95.
This decade has already brought us three landmark decisions by
the United States Supreme Court in the area of women's rights, Reed
v. Reed,1 Roe v. Wade,2 and Frontiero v. Richardson.3 Moreover,
with passage of the Equal Rights Amendment 4 by both houses of
Congress and, as of this writing, ratification by 30 states, a book like
this one by Midge Decter seems strangely out-of-date.
Decter views the role of women as one largely circumscribed by
biology and tradition-"what women have found it given them to be ' 5and she chooses to view the women's movement of our time as one
which threatens the established order in a way not to her liking. As a
consequence, the book sets forth Decter's conception of "the movement" in four areas-work, sex, marriage, and maternity and child-care;
then, it proceeds to attack Decter's notion of what "the movement"
stands for as so many "straw people".
The central thesis of the book is that, contrary to the impression
one might get from "a casual glance" at the wom'fs liberation movement, the movement ". . does not embody a new wave of demand for
equal rights [nor] . . .signal a yearning for freedom," but on close

examination it "turns out to be about ... the difficulties women are
experiencing with the rights and freedoms they already enjoy." 6 Decter
elaborates upon this theme in a fashion disturbing to one trained as a
lawyer. Generality follows generality, and is only supported by
1 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (statutory preference for male applicants for appointment as administrator of an estate held unconstitutional).
2410 U.S. 113 (1973) (restrictive abortion laws held unconstitutional as
violative of a woman's right to choose whether or not to terminate a pregnancy).
3411 U.S. 677 (1973) (statutes requiring a female member of the armed
services to prove the dependency of her husband in order to obtain benefits, even
though male members need not prove dependency of their wives, held unconstitutional discrimination; four members of the Court's majority stated further that
sex is an "inherently suspect" classification which must be subjected to "strict
judicial scrutiny").

4 H.R. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
6M. DeCE,

Tim NEw CaAsrry ANz Ormm AnGcutm

AGAINST WoMENa s

Lmma7.roN 57 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Ducram].
6 DECE 43. One wonders how Decter justifies this comment in light of the
strong support of most women active in the women's movement for the Equal
Rights Amendment.

1162

KENTUCKY LAw JOURNAL

[Vol. 62

evidence unworthy of serious
consideration or, more commonly, by
7
no evidence whatsoever.
In attempting to discredit the entire women's movement, Decter
uses one technique in particular which undermines the thrust of any
of the arguments which follow. She invariably tends to lump together
all persons who have identified themselves with "Women's Liberation"
and to talk about "the movement" as though it stood for one set of
unanimously agreed upon ideas, which it clearly does not. At least
at one point in the text Decter appears to concede that "the movement" is split into factions with very different ideas on a particular
issue; but she then proceeds to state that "the entire movement in the
end speaks with a single voice," citing as evidence a quotation from
the most radical single work of the many she has just discussed.8
That sort of analysis strikes this reader as intellectually dishonest, yet
it is in precisely this way that Decter tries to hold the entire women's
movement for the ideas of a fraction of its adherents. 9
In addition to thus narrowing her focus to the small core of more
radical (and hence more vulnerable) members of the movement,
while simultaneously attempting to portray them as representative of
the whole, Decter further offends the lawyer-reader by totally ignoring
not only the role of law in the traditional treatment of women but also
the way in which women striving for equal rights and freedom have
increasingly turned to law and the courts-with considerable success
-to achieve those ends. A few examples of her most significant
failures in this regard should be sufficient.
With respect to marriage, for example, Decter proclaims that it is
an institution entered into "for the sake of bringing a much needed
7

E.g., "the plain unvarnished fact is that every woman wants to marry."

DECrER
8

124.

175-78.
Decter also skews her analysis by largely confining her discussion of
"women" to two categories: middle-class married women and middle-class young
unmarried women. She shows no interest whatever in the older unmarried
woman and her problems, nor does she exhibit any concern for poor women of
any age. Perhaps this oversight is the result of her assuming, along with many
others, that because the women's movement has been spearheaded by middle-class
women, it can be attacked as a middle-class movement which ignores the concerns
of non-middle-class women. This is demonstrably false. The women's movements
concern with women's rights to equal job opportunities, equal social security benefits, equal educational opportunities, and tax deductions for home and child-care
expenses for working women reveals considerable interest in the problems of lowincome women. Similarly, the struggle against restrictive abortion laws, a struggle
to which many middle-class women contributed, was not pursued strictly out of
self-interest. Middle-class women never felt the harshness of the laws restrictions
to the same extent as poor women, and the unequal treatment of poor women
under these laws was objected to from the very beginning of the legal effort
mounted against them. See Charles & Alexander, Abortions for Poor and Nonwhite Women: A Denial of Equal Protection?, 23 HAsnNcs L.J. 147 (1971).
DECTER

9

BooK
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fixity and security to its female member" and puzzles over the characterization of marriage by "Women's Liberation" as "the very model
of exploitation of women by men."' 0 But Decter herself goes a long
way toward explaining the reasons for such a characterization in an
earlier passage of the book in which she notes the "alteration" wrought
in a woman's life by marriage: "She is now .. .defined by the fact
that she is a wife." 11 At the same time, "[t]his will not at all be true
of her husband.... A husband is an incidental thing to be.... She
is his, but he is not her's in anything like the same way."' 2 Why this
disparity? For one thing,
she takes his name ....Moreover,.. . she will be expected to
fit her own professional life, if she has one, as well as her social
behavior to his needs as the family's major breadwinner. If he
must live in a certain place, or
3 in a certain style, or according to a
certain routine, so must she.'
Most important, according to Decter, she will call upon him for
"support and protection," including not only "economic security," but
4
also "care and love."'
These elements of marriage are indeed the traditional ones which
are a cause of much discontent among contemporary women. Such
a formerly unquestioned practice as the wife's taking of the husband's
surname is no longer automatically acceded to by all women who
marry. Despite unfavorable court decisions, both in the past and
more recently,'I it is becoming increasingly common for a woman
to continue to use her maiden name after marriage, and lawsuits to
establish the right to do so are continuing.'0
The question of choice of domicile is another matter in which both
law and tradition have kept women from being equal partners in a
marriage. Under pressure from women disadvantaged by this legallysanctioned bias, state legislatures are beginning to reexamine the
relevant law and to effect changes in it. California, for example, has
recently acted to enable married women to establish residences apart
from their husbands, thereby allowing them to qualify for reduced
tuition and fee requirements at state colleges and universities.' 7
1

0 DECrM 134.

"1Id. at 131-32.
22 Id.at 132.
13 Id.
14 Id. at

183.

15 See, e.g., People ex rel. Rago v. Lipsky, 63 N.E.2d 642 (IMI.1945).
'6 NmvswEm, Aug. 20, 1973, at 49-50. For a discussion of various objections
to the automatic substitution of a husband's name. for that of his wife, see Hughes,
And 1Then There Were Two, 23 HAsTmos L.J. 233 (1971).
7 San Diego Union, Sept. 9, 1973, at D-10, col. 6.
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Shaping of professional lives to meet the needs of husbands is
similarly no longer a reflex action on the part of women pursuing
important work. Increasingly, partners in marriages in which both
husband and wife work accommodate themselves to the demands of
each other's professions. It is no longer unusual to hear of couples
who move to a new city because the wife, rather than the husband,
has been offered a better job there (it recently happened in the case
of one woman elected to Congress in 1972 and is an increasingly
familiar phenomenon in the academic world) or of husbands and/or
wives who commute previously unthinkable distances, sometimes by
airplane, in order that both can pursue the best job opportunities
open to them."'
As for the "support and protection" expected by wives, one need
only look at statistics on desertion and other manifestations of unwillingness by husbands to provide either "economic security" or "care
and love" to be convinced that marriage is not always the protective
umbrella Decter describes it to be. Even if one concedes Decter's
argument that women "marry freely and of their own volition" (rather
than because society has "in a number of ways trapped them into it"
-which she maintains is the position of the women's movement), it
does not necessarily follow that women are, for that reason, "concerned
with . . . pleasing their husbands."' 9 Women who have received
little or, no training enabling them to work at a well-paid job, who
face unequal job opportunities even when they have such training (as
Decter herself admits is commonly the case), 20 and who are saddled
with the primary responsibility for rearing any children they may
have cannot afford to be unconcerned with their husbands' demands,
whether they married "freely and of their own volition" or not. A
husband who threatens to leave such a woman confronts her with a
desperate outcome, especially if he is either unable or unwilling to
provide generous support for her and her children when he leaves,
because the woman and her children may be forced to go on welfare
or otherwise suffer both financially and socially. Unless a woman in
this position is fortunate enough to marry a man who can, and in fact
does, provide all the "support and protection" as Decter's argument
assumes, she may face the unpleasant alternatives of a miserable life
either with or without him. This is the sort of "exploitation" to which
the women's movement objects; this is the reason for its emphasis
upon equal education, equal job opportunity and, when possible,
18 See NEwswEK, Dec. 10, 1973, at 123-24.
19
DEcTER 135.
20 Id. at 52.
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equalization of the burden of child-care. Without these a woman is
indeed open to "exploitation" by her husband, and for these reasons
most women cannot continue to view marriage as the ultimate goal of
their existence. 21
In discussing childbearing and child-care, Decter asserts:
Once pregnant, .. . there is no carefully prescribed tradition to
lend guidance [to a woman] for what she may do. If she is working, she may continue to work, at least for a good while.... She
is permitted... to make as little or as much of 22
the fact of being
pregnant as her own private spirit inclines her to.
Here again Decter reveals considerable ignorance of the realities
which face American women. Clearly, she is totally unaware of (or
has chosen to ignore) the fact that pregnant women who either need
or merely wish to continue working are frequently prohibited from
doing so.
Cleveland Board of Educationv. LaFleur,and Cohen v. Chesterfield
County School Board,23 two cases challenging such prohibitions, were
brought together before the Supreme Court in 1973. Both cases
attack school board policies which required pregnant teachers to
take unpaid leave for a specified period of time, and both were typical
of a host of similar cases which have been brought in other jurisdictions. In striking -down the policy of the Cleveland school board,
which required an unpaid leave of absence from five months before
the expected birth of a child until the beginning of the first school,
term after the child is three months old, the Sixth Circuit described
the policy as "arbitrary and unreasonable in its overbreadth." 24 The
Fourth Circuit, sitting en bane in Cohen, concluded otherwise. The
Supreme Court upheld the Sixth Circuit and reversed the Fourth,
concluding that "neither the necessity for continuity of instruction
nor the state interest in keeping physically unfit teachers out of the
classroom can justify the sweeping mandatory leave regulations"25
21 It is not only deserted women who face an unkind world in the absence
of a husband. There is also a high incidence of poverty among households headed
by women who have been widowed and divorced. The woman with children to
sup ort, even where increased job opportunities exist, is frequently placed below
or close to the poverty line because the mere existence of the children may deny
her the opportunity of full-time employment. The increased job opportunities available today are still less than totally satisfactory. Jobs open to women tend to be
concentrated in the low-paying occupations, in part because women lack the skills
for high-paying jobs. Women who have acquired only household skills have few
abilities marketable in an industrial economy. D. HAMLTON, A Pn=Ra ON THE
EcoNoaucs
OF PovmvTy 68-69 (1968).
22
DECcw 169.
23 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
24 465 F.2d 1184, 1188 (1972).
25 414 U.S. 632, 647-48 (1974).
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adopted by the school boards, and that such regulations violate the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because they employ "unwarranted conclusive presumptions that seriously burden the
exercise of protected constitutional liberty," specifically, the right of a
26
female teacher to decide to bear a child.
In still another recent case, Susan R. Struck, an Air Force nurse
who faced an automatic discharge from the service when she became
pregnant, sought to block her discharge in the courts. Despite her
arguments that it is uneconomical and unwise to discharge an officer
whose training has been costly to the government merely because
she has become pregnant and that at all times during her pregnancy
she was ready, willing, and able to perform her duties, Captain Struck
lost in both lower courts.27 She appealed her suit to the Supreme
Court, which was able to avoid a decision on the merits by remanding
the case for decision in light of subsequent regulations permitting a
waiver of compulsory discharge upon application by the pregnant
28
servicewoman.
These lawsuits undoubtedly represent only the tip of the iceberg
in this area. If government policies are inhibiting, as these cases
demonstrate, the attitudes prevailing in private industry are likely
to be even more so. While many employers may be happy to have
their competent employees-pregnant or not-work for them whenever
possible, the fact remains that there is discrimination against some
pregnant women who choose to work throughout their pregnancies.
Contrary to Decter's casual assumption, the decision does not always
remain with the woman herself.
With respect to sex discrimination in employment in general,
Decter's position is that women, far from being excluded from the
centers of power in this society, "cannot tolerate the terms imposed
upon them by so much of power as they already enjoy' 29 and that
"Women's Liberationists" use the notion of "male supremacy" to
"excuse" women's retreat from power and responsibility. 0 Instead of
proposing to "alter themselves" to fit our present society, they prefer
to demand "an alteration of all the present arrangements of society,"
seeking a new society which "would shape itself to them."31 These assertions, based upon virtually no supporting authority, are weakened
by Decter's own admission that:
26
Id.at
27

651.

See 460 F.2d 1372 (9th Cir. 1972).
28 Struck v. Secretary of Defense, 409 U.S. 1071 (1972).
29 DEcTEI

52.

SOd.at 53.

slid. at 55.
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3 2many
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instances paid less for the work they do than men would be.
She answers this by saying that these are, "however, issues of injustice
that lend themselves not to the large-scale analysis of a liberation
movement but to the particular and practical application of pressure
against the -wrongdoers."33 But, one must ask, the "application of
pressure" by whom? Precisely how does an individual who has been
"discouraged" from undertaking the practice of medicine or of law
or of plumbing, by whatever forces are at work in the society, apply
"pressure against the wrongdoers"? Just when does an individual who
believes that she is "paid less for the work she does"-as a secretary
or as a nurse or as a household worker-'than a man would be" (if
men were employed in those jobs), complain about the situation in
hopes of improving her condition? The fact is that there is at present
no means by which a "particular application of pressure" might be
brought which could begin to bring relief to the individuals hurt in
these ways. It is perhaps only through a large-scale movement which
continually brings such questions of pervasive sex discrimination to
the forefront of the public conscience that women can hope to achieve
any meaningful change in the traditional patterns of sex-role stereotyping which they face today.
Even in the situation of outright sex discrimination, e.g., where an
individual woman employee is aware that she is paid less for identical
work performed by male co-workers or where she is passed over for
promotion in favor of a less-qualified man, a woman is unlikely to
complain unless and until she believes that her complaint will be
heard and, even more fundamentally, until there exists a mechanism
through which such complaints can be heard. Until the passage of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,34 women confronting
job discrimination had few means of recourse to government agencies
or to the courts; and, even after passage of the act, some time went
by before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the
courts began to pay serious attention to claims of sex discrimination.
The present level of attention given to such claims must be credited
in large part to the women's movement, which has not only repeatedly
and articulately reminded us that sex discrimination exists and that
efforts must be made to eradicate it, but also has assisted innumerable
32 Id.at 52.
33 Id.
34 42

U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-15 (1964).
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women in bringing their individual cases before the appropriate
agencies and courts. Decter's contention that
where there is no disagreement as to what constitutes an injustice
-as there is none with respect to issues bearing on the rights of
women today-the constant vociferous harping on it tends to lead
to the35suspicion that one is here witnessing the beating of a dead
horse.
simply begs the question. There is in fact tremendous disagreement
as to whether or not particular infringements upon women's rights to
equal job opportunities constitute "an injustice" or not. If there were
no such disagreement, the body of case law which has developed
under Title VII, the Equal Pay Act,30 and similar legislation would
not exist, nor would the increasing number of challenges brought on
constitutional grounds. Decter's logic is questionable in doubting the
usefulness of a movement which constantly nags at the conscience
and elsewhere, with
of society and confronts it, through the courts
37
individual cases of inequality and hardship.
In sum, this reader finds almost nothing worthy of praise in Decter's
book. One need not be a '"omen's Liberationist", to use Decter's
phrase, to acknowledge the value which the current movement for
women's equality has already contributed to our lives and promises to
add in the future. With the exception of a few more radical members,
the movement as a whole does not stand for the ultimate nullification
of sexual differences and the triumph of a wholly new order based
on the "New Biology", as Decter would have her readers believe.38
It does stand for the treatment of women as persons entitled to the
same opportunities and the same rights to human dignity as men.
It stands for the right of all women to choose what sort of person they
will be. Is that really asking so very much?
Susan Grossman Alexander*
35 DECTER 52-53.
Pub. L. No. 88-88, amending 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1963).
36
37
For a probing analysis of the failure of the American judiciary to respond
readily to contentions of sex discrimination, and the need to continue to confront
it with these contentions in hopes of increasing judicial understanding and sensitivity to the serious issues involved, see Johnston & Knapp, Sex Discrimination by
Law: A Study in Judicial Perspective, 46 N.Y.U.L. IEv. 675 (1971).
178-79. It can hardly be questioned that the scientists presently
38 DECT
experimenting with the sort of "genetic engineering" and "biological manipulation" which Decter fears are predominantly male. See D. RoRvix & L. Smar=Lvm,
Your BABY's SEx: Now You CAN CHOOSE 115-22 (1970).
* Adjunct Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law. A.B.,
Washington University (1963); M.A., Northwestern University (1964); J.D.
Harvard University (1967). Admitted to the state bars of California, Illinois, and
Michigan.

